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“A SYSTEM APPALLINGLY OUT OF
BALANCE”: MORGAN V. STATE AND
THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS AND
VICTIMS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT
PROSECUTIONS
DANIEL E. DOTY*
ABSTRACT
In a series of three cases that culminate with Morgan v. State, Alaska’s
courts established a unique protection for defendants in sexual assault cases.
This protection, which allows such defendants to attack their victims in court
with previous reports of sexual assault that did not result in prosecution, is
not afforded to defendants in other cases and is based on a dubious “general
principle” that the credibility of sexual assault victims has “special
relevance.” The protection is problematic in several ways: it is grounded in
erroneous stereotypes about the victims of sex crimes; it is detrimental to
victims and the pursuit of truth; it is inconsistent with traditional rules of
evidence; and it is unnecessary to protect the rights of defendants. For these
reasons, this protection for defendants in sexual assault cases should be
abrogated by legislative action as proposed herein.

INTRODUCTION
Alaska law currently permits accused rapists and child molesters to
put the credibility of their victims on trial by presenting evidence that
the victim, at some point in the past, may have made a false allegation of
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rape or sexual abuse of a child against another person. The law was
established in a series of three cases exempting evidence about the
credibility of rape victims from the general ban on propensity evidence.
In the first two cases, Covington v. State1 and Johnson v. State,2 the Alaska
Court of Appeals began to carve out the credibility exception without
addressing the conflict with the Alaska Rules of Evidence. The third
case, Morgan v. State,3 incorrectly cited Covington and cases from other
jurisdictions in support of a non-existent general principle that the
credibility of sexual assault and sexual abuse victims carries a “special
relevance” that exempts it from the ordinary restrictions of the rules of
evidence.4
The Court of Appeals established with these three cases a right for
defendants accused of sex crimes that does not extend to other
defendants. In doing so, it has limited the rights of sex crime victims in a
manner that is unparalleled in the rights of victims of other crimes.
Alaska’s Court of Appeals has perpetuated the common myth that false
reports of sexual assault are a frequent occurrence and that the women
who make them will do so again and again.5 The unnecessary and
harmful protection created by the Morgan exception conflicts with the
true general principles of evidentiary law, and must be changed.
This Article seeks to explain the evolution of the law in Alaska and
1. 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
2. 889 P.2d 1076 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
3. 54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
4. Id. at 336. Specifically, the court characterized the Confrontation Clause
rationale as follows:
[A] restatement of the principle that, in sexual assault prosecutions, a
complaining witness’s prior false accusation of sexual assault can
indeed have a special relevance—a relevance that removes this
evidence from the normal ban on attacking a witness’s general
character for honesty through the use of specific instances of
dishonesty.
Id.
5. This Article focuses on female victims of sexual violence as a deliberate
choice reflective of the epidemic of violence against women in Alaska. See
Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence in the State of Alaska: Key Results from
the 2010 Alaska Victimization Survey, COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & SEXUAL
ASSAULT (2010), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2010/1004.avs_2010/
1004.07a.statewide_summary.pdf (providing measures of intimate partner
violence and sexual violence from survey of 871 adult women in Alaska). The
choice of wording is not intended to diminish or overlook the painful and
frequent victimization of men and boys. See generally Shanta R. Dube et al., LongTerm Consequences of Childhood Sexual Abuse by Gender of Victim, 28 AM. J. OF
PREVENTATIVE MED. 430, 430–38 (2005) (finding approximately 16 percent of
males were sexually abused by the age of 18). The changes sought in this Article
are intended to benefit and protect all sexual assault victims, regardless of
gender.
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provide a useful recommendation for its amendment. Section I
addresses the law as it existed prior to Morgan. Section II of this Article
discusses the Morgan exception from the general ban on propensity
evidence as it evolved from Covington and Johnson to Morgan. Section III
contains an application of the exception in its current state to two factual
examples, which highlights its practical failings. Section IV addresses
defects in the exception’s factual and legal underpinnings. Section V
contains a proposal for legislative action to change the law, and Section
VI concludes.

I. THE LAW PRIOR TO MORGAN
A. The General Ban on Using Prior Bad Acts to Prove Character Traits
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(a) bars the admission of character
evidence. Rule 404(a) states that, in general, “[e]vidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of
proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion . . . .”6 There are three exceptions to this rule. First, evidence of
a relevant character trait of a defendant can be admitted in a criminal
prosecution.7 Second, evidence of a relevant character trait of a crime
victim can be admitted if (1) the party seeking to admit it applies for an
order of the court, (2) the court conducts a hearing outside of the
presence of the jury to determine if the evidence is relevant and not
unduly prejudicial or confusing, (3) the court issues an order that clearly
identifies what evidence may be introduced and the nature of the
questions that will be permitted, and (4) in a prosecution for sexual
assault or attempted sexual assault, the victim’s conduct occurred less
than a year before the date of the offense charged.8 Finally, evidence of a
witness’s character may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.9
Unless these exceptions for defendants, victims, or witnesses are met,
evidence of character traits is categorically excluded from the
proceedings. In other words: character evidence is presumptively
inadmissible unless the proponent establishes otherwise.

6. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a).
7. Id. 404(a)(1).
8. Id. 404(a)(2). Evidence of a victim’s conduct in a sexual assault
prosecution may be admitted if more than a year old if the proponent makes a
persuasive showing that it is necessary. Id.
9. Id. 404(a)(3).
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B. How to Prove a Character Trait
There is a difference between a “character trait” and the evidence
that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a character trait.10 “The
defendant is a violent person,” or “the witness is dishonest” are
examples of relevant character traits. In and of themselves, these “traits”
are not evidence; rather, they must be established by evidence. Rule
404(a), discussed above, establishes when and where a party may seek
to prove a character trait, but the rule provides no guidance on how to
establish or prove the existence of that trait. For such guidance one must
look outside Rule 404(a) to Rules 404(b), 405, and 607 through 609.
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) establishes a strict bar on the use of
specific prior instances of conduct for the sole purpose of proving a
character trait. Specifically, Rule 404(b)(1) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible if
the sole purpose for offering the evidence is to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith. It is, however, admissible for other
purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.11
As with Rule 404(a), there are exceptions to this ban on propensity
evidence. One of these exceptions is enumerated in the rule itself:
evidence of specific prior bad acts is admissible to establish facts other
than the character of a person. Others are enumerated in the subsections
of Rule 404(b). These subsections allow the prosecutor, with certain
restrictions and predicate requirements, to present evidence that the
defendant committed similar acts in the past in prosecutions alleging (1)
sexual assault or abuse of a minor,12 (2) sexual assault or attempted

10. See id. 405 (establishing the methods of proving character). That such a
rule exists demonstrates that the court considers the existence of character traits
to be a separate and distinct piece of information or evidence from the opinions,
actions, and observations that could be used to prove whether or not a person
possesses such a trait.
11. Id. 404(b)(1).
12. Id. 404(b)(2). The rule states that:
In a prosecution for a crime involving a physical or sexual assault or
abuse of a minor, evidence of other acts by the defendant toward the
same or another child is admissible if admission of the evidence is not
precluded by another rule of evidence and if the prior offenses (i) are
similar to the offense charged; and (ii) were committed upon persons
similar to the prosecuting witness.
Id.
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sexual assault,13 and (3) crimes involving domestic violence.14 If
evidence of specific prior acts does not fall within one of these
exceptions, Rule 404(b) prevents its admission.
Another evidence rule, Rule 405, provides further guidance to a
party seeking to prove a character trait. This rule provides that where
evidence of a character trait is admissible under the other rules of
evidence, the trait can be proved with opinion evidence or reputation
evidence.15 Evidence of specific instances of conduct is only admissible
on cross-examination,16 or where character or trait of character is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense.17
The character of a witness is not an “essential element of a . . .
defense” in all cases where a defendant could conceivably point to a
witness or victim’s character in an effort to absolve himself of liability.18
Instead, the character of a witness is an essential element only in cases in
which “a litigant must, as a matter of law, prove a person’s character in
order to prevail.”19 Thus, for example, Rule 405 prohibits the admission
of specific prior bad acts even for the sole purpose of proving character
in a murder case to establish that the victim was the first aggressor, as a
person’s “character for violence” is not an element of the crime of
murder or of self-defense.20 In such cases, the victim’s character for
violence is relevant but the defendant may only prove it through
reputation or opinion evidence.21 Character is only rarely an element,
such as in defamation cases where the truth of statements about the
plaintiff’s character is relevant to the statutory requirement that the
13. Id. 404(b)(3). The full text of this rule states that:
In a prosecution for a crime of sexual assault in any degree, evidence of
other sexual assaults or attempted sexual assaults by the defendant
against the same or another person is admissible if the defendant relies
on a defense of consent. In a prosecution for a crime of attempt to
commit sexual assault in any degree, evidence of other sexual assaults
or attempted sexual assaults by the defendant against the same or
another person is admissible.
Id. This is a broader rule than 404(b)(2). See supra, note 12.
14. Id. 404(b)(4). See generally Bingaman v. State, 76 P.3d 398 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2003) (discussing Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) in depth).
15. Id. 405(a).
16. Id.
17. Id. 405(b).
18. Id.
19. Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233, 1240 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
20. Id.
21. Id. The court was careful to add that specific instances of conduct may
be admissible in such a case to prove a matter beyond the victim’s propensity for
violence, like the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that deadly force was
necessary. Id. at 1241–42, citing Amarok v. State, 671 P.2d 882, 883–84 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983).
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plaintiff establish the falsity of the defendant’s statements.22 A witness’s
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is no more an element of the
crime of sexual assault or any defense to such a crime than it would be
for any other type of crime.23
Finally, Rule 404(a) points a proponent of character evidence
directly to Rules 607 through 609. These rules provide that (1) anyone,
including the party calling a witness, may impeach that witness or
bolster that witness in response to that impeachment,24 (2) credibility can
be attacked by opinion evidence about truthful or untruthful character,
but specific instances of conduct are not admissible except when offered
on cross-examination of a witness who provided opinion as to another
witness’s character,25 and (3) evidence of convictions is only admissible
to prove dishonest conduct if the prior conviction is for a crime of
dishonesty.26 Of particular relevance to the question of a sexual assault
victim’s dishonesty is the second of these rules, Rule 608. Rule 608 states
in full that:
If a witness testifies concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of a previous witness, the specific instances of
conduct probative of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the
previous witness, may be inquired into on cross-examination.
Evidence of other specific instances of the conduct of a witness
offered for the purpose of attacking or supporting that
witness’s credibility is inadmissible unless such evidence is
explicitly made admissible by these rules, by other rules
promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court or by enactment of
the Alaska Legislature.27
In other words, Rule 608 provides that specific instances of
dishonesty are only admissible in limited circumstances, as illustrated
by the following example: Witness A testifies as an eyewitness to a
crime. Witness B, called by the defense, testifies that Witness A has a
reputation for dishonesty. The prosecutor can (1) cross-examine Witness
B with specific instances of Witness A’s truthful behavior, or (2) call
Witness C to say that Witness A has a reputation for truthfulness. If and
only if the prosecutor chooses to call Witness C can the defendant’s
attorney present evidence of specific prior bad acts of Witness A’s
dishonesty, which he is permitted to do only because the prosecutor

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.070 (2014).
E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410–11.41.445.
ALASKA R. EVID. 607.
Id. 608.
Id. 609.
Id. 608.
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opened a door otherwise closed by Rule 608.
Considering these rules together, one might conclude that evidence
of a sexual assault victim’s previous false report of sexual assault would
be inadmissible. While the victim’s character for dishonesty is a relevant
trait under Rule 404(a), it is not an element of the crime of sexual assault
or any defense to it. Thus, Rules 404(b), 405, and 608 should operate to
prevent the admission of specific prior acts of dishonesty, including
evidence of prior false reports of sexual assault, unless and until the
defendant attacks the victim’s credibility with reputation evidence and
the prosecutor elects to bolster the victim’s credibility with reputation
testimony by another witness. Under Alaska law in its present state,
however, this is not the case.

II. THE MORGAN EXCEPTION TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
In 2002, the Alaska Court of Appeals held in Morgan v. State28 that
evidence of a sexual assault victim’s prior false report of sexual assault
was admissible at trial if the defendant proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that “(1) the complaining witness made another accusation
of sexual assault, (2) that this accusation was factually untrue, and (3)
that the complaining witness knew that the accusation was untrue.”29 In
doing so, the Court explicitly stated that it was categorically
“remov[ing] this evidence from the normal ban on attacking a witness’s
general character for honesty through the use of specific instances of
dishonesty.”30 Understanding this new rule, which is explicitly
incompatible with the rest of the rules of evidence, requires a discussion
of its history.

28. 54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
29. Id. at 333.
30. Id. at 335. This language, referring to a “normal ban on attacking a
witness’s general character for honesty,” does not accurately describe the
evidentiary ban on propensity evidence. As discussed previously, the “general
ban” created by the rules prohibits parties from establishing evidence of a
relevant character trait, like honesty or dishonesty, with specific instances of
dishonesty. There is no ban on attacking a witness’s general character for
honesty through the use of specific instances of dishonesty. The situation the
court describes—attacking one witness’s general opinion that another witness is
honest—is in fact the only time a party can present specific acts of dishonesty.
ALASKA R. EVID. 608. As the discussion of the full opinion should make clear, this
error should be understood to mean that the court was removing the evidence
from the ordinary ban that would in fact be placed on it by the Rules of Evidence.
See supra, Section I.B.
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A. Covington v. State
The court first addressed the question of the admissibility of prior
false reports of sexual assault or abuse in Covington v. State.31 Covington
was charged with and convicted of sexually abusing his minor
daughter.32 During voir dire of the witness, his daughter, D.C.O.,
admitted that she had previously accused her grandfather and another
man named J.D. of sexual assault.33 Covington argued that he should
have been permitted to call the grandfather to establish that D.C.O. had
made a false report, thereby challenging D.C.O.’s credibility.
Specifically, he argued that exclusion of the grandfather’s testimony
violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.34 The
State, however, argued that the testimony would have been irrelevant
because past reports had no bearing on the truth of whether she had
been assaulted on this occasion, and that admitting the evidence would
simply be a “swearing contest” between D.C.O. and her grandfather.35
The trial excluded the grandfather’s testimony, and Covington
appealed.36
The court did not reverse the trial judge.37 In its opinion, however,
the court did not foreclose the possibility that other defendants with
better evidence could admit such testimony or even that Covington
himself could not do so on remand.38 Specifically, the court stated that
“[a] defendant who wishes to use [evidence of prior false reports of
sexual assault] at trial must obtain a preliminary ruling from the trial
court that it is admissible.”39 This determination requires “a showing out
of the presence of the jury that the witness[‘s] prior allegations of sexual
assault were false, as, for example, where the charges somehow had
been disproved or where the witness had conceded their falsity.”40 The
court held that Covington had not made this showing but “assume[d]
that on remand Covington [would] be given a reasonable opportunity to
attempt to show the falsity of the prior accusations.”41 In finding this,
the court did not articulate any legal basis for the holding. It merely
found that other courts’ rulings in similar cases were persuasive,
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 438.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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without discussing the inconsistency of the holding with Evidence Rules
404, 405, and 607 through 609.42 The court failed to explain whether
falsity establishes relevance but not admissibility, or whether falsity,
once established, guarantees that the evidence will be admitted.
B. Johnson v. State
The issue remained untouched and unsettled for ten years. In 1995,
the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Johnson v. State,43 which in
some ways clarified Covington and in other ways served to further
muddy the waters. In Johnson, trial testimony established that the victim,
L.K., left a bar and hitchhiked home.44 Defendants John and Russell
Johnson stopped to offer her a ride. L.K. reported to police later that
night that the Johnsons had raped her at gunpoint.45 John testified at
trial that he had consensual sex with L.K. and that Russell did not have
any sexual contact with her at all.46 The defendants sought to present
evidence that L.K. had reported two similar sexual assaults in January
1979 and that these reports had not been substantiated or prosecuted
because L.K. had not cooperated after her initial report.47 They argued
that this indicated the reports could be false and thus admissible under
Covington.48 The trial court refused to allow the defendants to introduce
evidence, particularly the testimony of L.K., and of the falsity of the two
prior assaults.49 The Johnsons were both convicted and they appealed on
the grounds, inter alia, that the trial court erred in preventing
questioning on the prior reports.50 In doing so, the Johnsons relied on
Evidence Rule 404(a)(2), which allows evidence of a relevant character
trait of a victim of a crime to be admitted after a hearing.51
The Johnson court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the evidence.
The court held that the ruling in Covington “suggest[s] that evidence of
past false reports of sexual assault may under some circumstances be
admissible to discredit an alleged victim’s current claims of sexual
assault,” but the court also concluded that “the proponent of such

42. See id. (holding that a majority of courts that have considered the issue
have held that, at a minimum, a defendant must make a threshold showing that
a report is false before it can be presented).
43. 889 P.2d 1076 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
44. Id. at 1078.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1079.
51. Id.
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evidence bears the threshold burden of establishing the falsity of the
past reports.”52 The court held that “the off chance of discovering
falsehood did not vest the Johnsons with the right to demand that L.K.
testify” about the prior reports.53 The court rejected the Johnsons’
404(a)(2) argument because such hearings only arise “when necessary”
and are not to be used as a discovery tool.54 Such hearings are only
“necessary” where there is a “threshold showing of good cause—that is,
upon proof of a colorable ground to believe that character evidence
favorable to the defense actually does exist and will be disclosed by the
requested examination.”55 The court affirmed the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling because the Johnsons failed to establish that there was
a “likelihood, or even [a] possibility, of a recantation.”56 The court never
addressed the fact that while Rule 404(a)(2) establishes that a relevant
character trait of a victim can be discussed at trial, Rules 404(b) and 405
state that specific instances of conduct cannot be used to establish the
existence of that trait.
C. Morgan v. State
After Covington and Johnson, Rule 404 appeared to remain valid in
cases involving the credibility of sexual assault cases. Neither case
expressly repudiated the ban articulated in the evidence rules on
admitting specific instances of conduct to prove character as expressed
in the Rules of Evidence. Indeed, the Johnson court stated that per
Covington, such evidence may be, but is not automatically, admissible.57
An attorney seeking to reconcile the Rules of Evidence with these
holdings could conclude that reports that are not provably false are,
without question, irrelevant and thus inadmissible, but that provably
false reports may be admitted for purposes consistent with Rules 404(b)
and 607 through 609.
In 2002, however, the court issued a ruling in Morgan v. State58 that
unequivocally precluded this reading.59 Morgan was tried for sexual
assault and asked the trial judge to allow him to introduce the testimony
of witnesses who were going to say that the victim had made previous

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1078 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1079.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1078.
54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 332–33.
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false accusations of sexual assault against other men.60 The trial court
denied him the opportunity to do so, and Morgan was convicted.61
The Court of Appeals characterized the question before it as,
“[w]hat exactly must a defendant prove when seeking to establish that
an alleged sexual assault victim has made a prior false accusation of
rape? And what is the burden of proof on this issue?”62 Summarizing its
answer, the court mischaracterized its previous opinions, stating:
[W]e held [in those cases that evidence of prior false reports] is
admissible if, as a foundational matter, the defendant
establishes the falsity of the prior accusations. . . . If the trial
judge concludes that, more likely than not, the complaining
witness made a knowingly false accusation of sexual assault on
another occasion, then the defendant will be permitted to
present this evidence to the jury.63
Ignored entirely was the Johnson court’s prior statement that
“evidence of past false reports of sexual assault may under some
circumstances be admissible to discredit an alleged victim’s current
claims of sexual assault . . . . ”64 The Morgan court decided that the law
had been clear for seventeen years, that in all circumstances, the
evidence is admissible as long as falsity is established, and that the only
uncertainty for practitioners was how much evidence the defendant
needed to present to the court under 404(a)(2) before putting the victim
on trial and shifting attention away from the defendant’s conduct.65
The Court of Appeals recognized for the first time the conflict
between this new rule and the Rules of Evidence:
[Other states’] decisions in this area focus on two potential legal
impediments to a defendant’s right to introduce evidence of
prior false accusations. The first impediment is the rule
embodied in Alaska Evidence Rules 405 and 608: the
prohibition against attacking a witness’s character for honesty
by presenting proof of specific instances in which the witness
has acted dishonestly. The second impediment is the rule that a
party is not allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach
a witness’s answers on cross-examination regarding collateral
matters (such as the witness’s possible acts of dishonesty on

60. Id. at 333–34.
61. Id. at 340.
62. Id. at 333.
63. Id.
64. Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis
added).
65. Morgan, 54 P.3d at 336.
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other occasions).66
The court dismissed the conflict quickly. It noted that courts in
Texas, Oregon, and Kansas concluded that despite Rule 608, “the
confrontation clause of the Constitution requires this kind of
impeachment if the evidence of the complaining witness’s fabrication is
strong enough.”67 With this, the court asserted its holding:
We believe that this confrontation-clause rationale is, at its core,
simply a restatement of the principle that, in sexual assault
prosecutions, a complaining witness’s prior accusation of
sexual assault can indeed have a special relevance—a relevance
that removes this evidence from the normal ban on attacking a
witness’s general character for honesty through the use of
specific instances of dishonesty. . . . [I]f the defendant proves
that a complaining witness has made prior false accusations of
sexual assault . . . , the defendant is not limited to crossexamining the complaining witness concerning these prior
accusations. Rather, the defendant can both cross-examine the
complaining witness and present extrinsic evidence on this
point.68
This is the current state of the law in Alaska. This Article will
explore its application to two hypothetical cases before critiquing the
legal reasoning that supports the court’s holding.

III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORGAN: EXPLORING
HYPOTHETICALS
A. Case Study One: Jane
Jane is a 30-year-old woman in 2015. In 2010, she went on a date
with Allen, whom she knew prior. In 2011, she reported to police that
Allen had sexually assaulted her during the date. When asked why she
waited to tell someone, she replied that Allen had threatened her.
Officers interviewed Allen, who admitted that he had sexual intercourse
with Jane, but stated that it was consensual. There were no eyewitnesses.
Because of the delay, there was no forensic evidence. The prosecutor
declined to prosecute the case due to the lack of corroborating evidence.
In 2015, Jane went on a date with a man named Bob. In the early
morning hours immediately following the date, Jane arrived at the

66. Id. at 335.
67. Id. at 336.
68. Id.
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police station. Crying, Jane told officers that Bob had sexually assaulted
her. She was transported to the hospital, where a Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner collected forensic evidence that proved Bob had engaged in
sexual intercourse with Jane. When officers attempted to interview Bob,
he declined to participate, as was his right. There were no other
witnesses. The prosecutor charged Bob with sexual assault in the first
degree. The defense attorney learned of Jane’s 2011 report and sought to
admit it as a prior false report. In requesting a hearing, the attorney
proffered Allen as a witness to deny that he sexually assaulted Jane.
A trial court, applying Morgan, would almost certainly have to
conduct a hearing. All three cases in the Morgan trilogy indicate that a
defendant has a right, on proffer of some credible evidence that goes
beyond mere speculation or curiosity, to attempt to meet his burden
under Morgan—a foundational showing he will probably satisfy by
proffering Allen’s testimony. Thus, even though Jane was raped in both
2010 and in 2015, she will now be forced to confront both of her rapists in
court to defend her integrity against an attack that the rules of evidence
would clearly not otherwise permit.
Applying the Morgan test, it is not clear whether Bob will be able to
meet his burden at the Morgan hearing because no case has defined what
quantum of evidence is necessary to establish that a false report
occurred. Bob will likely argue that the report is probably false because
Allen says he did not do it and the prosecutor declined to prosecute the
case. The FBI and International Association of Chiefs of Police have
issued guidelines stating that the following factors do not constitute a
false report: (1) insufficient evidence, (2) delayed reporting, (3) noncooperation, and (4) inconsistencies in the victim’s statement.69 Under
the guidelines, “[t]he determination that a report of sexual assault is
false can be made only if the evidence establishes that no crime was
committed or attempted.”70 Under these guidelines, Bob should not be
able to meet his burden because it should be virtually impossible for a
court to find Allen, who has a vested interest in denying that he sexually
assaulted Jane, credible. The court in Covington, however, stated that in
precisely these circumstances—where the determination of a false report
was based on a swearing contest between the D.C.O. and her
grandfather—the defendant should have a chance to establish that the

69. False Reporting, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR. 3 (2012),
http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications_NSVRC_Overview_Fal
se-Reporting.pdf.
70. Investigating Sexual Assaults, IACP NAT’L LAW ENF’T POL’Y CTR 12–13
(2005), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/IACP_InvestigatingSAConceptsIssues
Paper_7-2005.pdf.
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D.C.O. is not telling the truth.71 This result implies that the Court of
Appeals believes that under such circumstances the defendant could
actually meet his burden. Jane faces no protections from what should be
an unnecessary evidentiary hearing, and Covington leaves open the
possibility that Bob will prevail.
B. Case Study Two: Mary
Like Jane, Mary is a 30-year-old woman in 2015. In 2010, she went
on a date with a man named Charlie, and in 2011, she reported to
officers that Charlie raped her on that date. Charlie admitted to sexual
intercourse with Mary, but said it was consensual. Before the prosecutor
decided whether to accept the case, Mary called his office and recanted,
stating she made the report up. She asked the prosecutor to drop the
case, which the prosecutor did.
In 2015, Mary went on a date with David. Later that night, she
showed up at the police station crying, and reported that David had
sexually assaulted her. The officers attempted to interview David. He
declined, as was his right, but the officers noticed that David had
scratches that appeared to be consistent with defensive wounds on his
arms and face. There were five eyewitnesses who unanimously and
reliably identified David as the man who forced himself on Mary on the
night in question as she fought against him. Forensic evidence collected
by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner confirmed that David had sexual
intercourse with Mary, and Mary’s fingernail swabs and David’s DNA
(validly collected pursuant to a search warrant) indicated that Mary was
the one who scratched David’s arms and face. The prosecutor charged
David with sexual assault in the first degree. As in Jane’s case, the
defense attorney sought to admit evidence of Mary’s 2011 report and
recantation. He proffered David, Mary, and a paralegal from the
prosecutor’s office as conditional rebuttal witnesses in case Mary denies
her prior recantation.
Under Morgan and its predecessors, Mary’s prior report would
almost certainly be admissible because she recanted. Recantation is the
only evidence of falsity specifically identified and endorsed in any of the
cases.72 This disregards, however, that sexual assault victims can, and
often do, recant for a number of reasons. Oregon’s Sexual Assault Task

71. Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 441–42 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
72. See Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)
(discussing the “likelihood or even the possibility of recantation”); Covington,
703 P.2d at 441–42 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (discussing when a witness had
“conceded their falsity “).
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Force, for example, specifically exempts recantation from the definition
of false reporting because “[r]ecantations are routinely used by victims
to disengage the criminal justice system response and are therefore
NOT, by themselves, indicative of false reports.”73 In other words, a
sexual assault victim may wish for a variety of reasons not to continue
participating in the criminal justice response, which can be lengthy,
embarrassing, and difficult. Rules like Alaska’s, which permit an
invasive and normally impermissible inquiry into what may be a
traumatic personal history, only add to the difficulties sexual assault
victims face.
An additional defect in Morgan is highlighted by Mary’s case.
Morgan does not require a balancing test or an inquiry by the court into
whether the victim’s credibility is a question of particular relevance in
the case. Its unambiguous language requiring that “[i]f the trial judge
concludes that, more likely than not, the complaining witness made a
knowingly false accusation of sexual assault on another occasion, then
the defendant will be permitted to present this evidence to the jury”
allows the presentation of this evidence in any case where the defendant
makes the required showing.74 In Mary’s 2015 case, she told officers she
was sexually assaulted. There was physical evidence confirming that
David engaged in sexual penetration with Mary. There were multiple
eyewitnesses who identified David. David himself had scratches on his
arms and face. Mary’s credibility in this fact pattern is at most a
collateral issue, but the court will nevertheless likely be required to
indulge the defendant in his presentation of the 2011 report under the
holding in Morgan, permitting an invasive inquiry of dubious utility into
her character in front of the jury. The balancing test required by Rule 403
probably does not prevent this inquiry, as the cases above would give
any trial court good reason to conclude that the Court of Appeals has
already determined that this type of evidence is adequately relevant and
probative regardless of its prejudicial effect.75

IV. A FURTHER CRITIQUE OF THE MORGAN HOLDING
The preceding sections present a discussion of the practical

73. False Allegations, Recantations, and Unfounding in the Context of Sexual
Assault, OR. SEXUAL ASSAULT TASK FORCE 1 (2011), http://oregonsatf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/02/Position-Paper-False-Alleg3.pdf.
74. Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 333 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
75. Rule 403 states that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” ALASKA R. EVID. 403.
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problems highlighted in the application of Morgan, but there are a
number of other additional deficiencies in the opinion. First, the court in
Morgan placed undue weight on the reliability of evidence of alleged
false reports, and erroneously concluded that such evidence was
substantially more probative than prejudicial or misleading. Second, the
out-of-state cases the court cited for the general principle that sexual
assault victims’ credibility is a matter of “special relevance” do not all
stand for that proposition. One of them, in fact, specifically rejects that
premise.76 Third, the Confrontation Clause does not require admission
of this type of evidence. Finally, the holding violates the Alaska
Constitution’s protections for victims.
A. Disregarding Evidence on Prior False Reports of Sexual Assault
The Morgan court implicitly concluded that evidence that a victim
has allegedly made a prior false report of sexual assault is both relevant
and substantially more probative than prejudicial.77 Evidence Rule 402
provides that relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise stated,
and Rule 403 establishes that relevant evidence should be excluded if it
may cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury.78 The
court did not explicitly analyze evidence of prior alleged false reports
against Rules 402 and 403, but by holding that such evidence is
admissible, the court necessarily concluded that these reports comply
with those rules. In other words, the court concluded that evidence that
a victim has falsely reported a rape on a prior occasion tends to show
that the victim was not raped on the occasion in question. The court also
concluded that evidence of a prior false allegation has a tendency to
show that the current allegation is also false, and that this tendency is so
strong and so reliable that there is only minimal danger that a jury could
be confused or misled.79 This is simply not the case.
The first error the court made is in concluding that a victim’s
recantation of a prior report of sexual assault is relevant as a false
report.80 A survey of methodologically rigorous research found
76. Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (declining to
create a special exception to the Rules of Evidence for sex offenses).
77. See Morgan, 54 P.3d at 333 (placing only a preponderance of the evidence
burden upon a defendant to show that it is more likely than not that a previous
sexual assault allegation was more likely false than not before allowing the
defendant to present evidence of a previous false allegation in the current case).
78. ALASKA R. EVID. 402.
79. ALASKA R. EVID. 401–403 (if such evidence is admitted, a judge must
necessarily have determined that its probative value is not “outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice”).
80. Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); Covington
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adequate evidence to determine that a report is false in only around two
to eight percent of cases.81 By contrast, recantation is extremely common
among both child and adult sexual assault victims.82 This significant
difference indicates that recantation is not at all synonymous with false
reporting. Many signs that defendants will argue are indications of a
false report—inconsistencies in statements, recanting, delayed reports,
etc.—are in fact signs that a victim simply does not wish to participate in
the criminal justice system, and should not be used by courts to establish
any fact beyond that.83 The Court of Appeals in Covington, Johnson, and
Morgan erred in giving heavy weight to victim recantations.
Not only did the Morgan court err in concluding that recantations
are relevant, it erred in its conclusion that evidence of false reports
would be helpful to the jury determining criminal liability in a
subsequent case. The public at large consistently overestimates the
prevalence of false reporting.84 Thus it is likely that jurors, hearing
evidence that a victim has recanted on a prior occasion, are likely to
inaccurately conclude that the victim has made a prior false report
(which as we have seen is unlikely) and that she must be making a false
report at the present time as well (which is also unlikely). This illinformed “gut feeling” among jurors could sway them toward a
conclusion that, in all likelihood, is not based in fact. This is an
unacceptable risk of prejudice that should not have been tolerated by the
Morgan court.
B. Inapplicability of the “Special Relevance” Principle
In support of its holding in Morgan, the Court of Appeals opined
that there exists a general principle that the credibility of sexual assault
victims has a “special relevance” in sexual assault cases. The court cited

v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 441–42 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
81. Kimberly A. Longsway et al., False Reports: Moving Beyond the Issue to
Successfully Investigate and Prosecute Non-Stranger Sexual Assault, THE VOICE 2
(2009), http://ndaa.org/pdf/the_voice_vol_3_no_1_2009.pdf. See also Dara
Lind, What we know about false rape allegations, VOX (June 1, 2015),
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/1/8687479/lie-rape-statistics (discussing the
rationale behind these reports).
82. See Melissa Hamilton, Judicial Discourses Involving Domestic Violence
and Expert Testimony 123–29 (May 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The
University of Texas at Austin) (on file with University of Texas Libraries) (noting
that the frequency of recanting by domestic violence victims is a common theme
in expert testimony); L.C. Malloy et al., Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child
Sexual Abuse Allegations, 46 J. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 162–70
(explaining that over 23 percent of child sexual assault victims recant).
83. Longsway, supra note 81, at 4.
84. Id. at 3.
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opinions from Oregon, Kansas, and Texas in support of this
conclusion.85 However, Lopez v. State,86 a Texas opinion cited by the
court, does not actually stand for this general principle.87 In fact, the
Texas court specifically rejected the principle in a passage that cites
Covington v. State as an example of the incoherent reasoning behind the
principle. This passage, on which this Article could not seek to improve,
is quoted here at length:
Other states have held that the Confrontation Clause requires
creating a special exception for sexual offenses to allow
admission of prior false accusations of abuse by the
complainant despite evidentiary bars.88 But the rationale
behind these opinions is not at all clear. Some recurring themes
are that sex offenses are somehow unique because (1) they are
easily charged and difficult to disprove; (2) there are usually no
witnesses to the offense, so the credibility of the complainant
and defendant are more critical issues; and (3) the nature of the
charge is apt to arouse sympathy and create bias. None of these
rationales persuades us to create an across-the-board exception to the
Rules of Evidence for sex offenses.
• First, sex offenses are not any easier to charge or any
more difficult to disprove than any other case. In fact,
often it is just the opposite. . . . [I]t is often extremely
difficult for the victim to come forward. And these
offenses are no more difficult to disprove than any other
accusation. . . .
•

Credibility of the witnesses is no more important in sex
offenses than in any other case. Any case can involve a
swearing match between two witnesses: an assault in
which the defendant and the victim are alone and the
defendant threatens the victim with imminent bodily
injury; a kidnapping in which the defendant restrains
the victim in an isolated location and the victim
eventually escapes . . . . [T]he complainant’s and the
defendant’s credibility are no more critical issues in sex
offense cases than in any other type of case.

•

Any emotions associated with sex offenses are all the
more reason to prevent admission of prior false accusations by
the victim. . . . [V]ictims of a sexual offense . . . are
regarded differently from the “ordinary” victim. No
other victim of any offense is so likely to be accused of

85. Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
86. 18 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
87. Id. at 225 (declining to create a special exception to the Rules of Evidence
for sex offenses).
88. Citing, inter alia, Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
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fabricating, fantasizing, or “asking for it.” The increased
emotional level associated with sexual offenses is all the more
reason to refuse to allow the jury to be additionally confused
by collateral acts of misconduct by a witness. Indeed, that is
the entire purpose behind Rule 608(b).
Legal commentators have also recognized the peculiarity of the
sex-offense exception recognized in other states. Professors
Goode, Wellborn, and Sharlot point out that this rule “cannot
be easily squared with the dictates of Rule 608(b). Typically the
probative value of such evidence flows from the inference it
raises as to the complainant’s propensity to make false claims –
precisely the type of inference proscribed by Rule 608(b).”
We agree. . . . As the Ohio Court has pointed out, “the mere fact
that an alleged rape victim made prior false allegations does
not automatically mean that she is fabricating the present
charge.” Prior false allegations of abuse “do not tend to prove or
disprove any of the elements of rape.”
So the out-of-state cases recognizing a “sexual offense”
exception rely on nothing but generalizations, and the
generalizations are just not true in every case. It makes no sense
to say that certain factors will always be present in a case
involving a sexual offense but will never be present in a case
involving a different type of offense.89
This excerpt explains clearly and succinctly why the Morgan court
erred in relying on a general principle that credibility has a “special
relevance” in these cases. It establishes that the principle is based on
absolutely no evidence, empirical or even anecdotal.90 It explains that
the Morgan decision gives defendants the right to present evidence that
is, as the Texas court noted, marginally valuable and very prejudicial,
inflammatory, and confusing; prior false allegations are minimally
relevant to establish behavior in the current case and they can inflame
the passions of jurors who are already notoriously hesitant to convict.91
Finally, it demonstrates by its existence that the Morgan court assertion
that the principle is broadly accepted is erroneous.

89. Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 223–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (emphasis
added) (quoting GOODE, WELLBORN & SHARLOT, TEXAS PRACTICE: GUIDE TO THE
TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 608.1 (1998); State v. Boggs, 588
N.E.2d 813, 816–17 (Ohio 1992)).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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C. The Confrontation Clause Does Not Require the Admission of this
Evidence
The Court of Appeals created the Morgan exception on the theory
that in all sexual assault cases victim credibility has a “special relevance”
and that, because of this special relevance, trial courts must admit
evidence that tends to show prior false reports of sexual assault. This
approach, however, is not consistent with case law on the Confrontation
Clause. In Davis v. Alaska,92 the United States Supreme Court held that
cross-examination on specific instances of prior conduct was necessary
in order to show the existence of possible bias and prejudice, but that the
Confrontation Clause does not confer a right to impeach the general
credibility of a witness through cross-examination on specific prior bad
acts in every case.93 Applying this holding in Boggs v. Collins,94 a case
where the trial court refused to allow a defendant to cross-examine a
rape victim about an alleged prior false accusation of rape, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendant may be permitted to
do so only “when [evidence of a prior false report] reveals witness bias
or prejudice, but not when it is aimed solely to diminish a witness’s
general credibility.”95 In other words, federal courts have concluded that
the Confrontation Clause does not, in fact, require admission of prior
false reports of sexual assault in all cases, and have explicitly rejected the
notion that the Confrontation Clause permits use of such evidence to
attack general credibility.
Under these holdings, the Morgan exception is not necessary
because Rule 404(b) already satisfies the intent of the Confrontation
Clause. The rule prohibits use of specific prior acts to prove general
character, including general credibility, but it allows admission of
specific prior acts for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.96 This is precisely how the Boggs court
applied the Confrontation Clause when it determined that “bias or
prejudice” could justify admission of evidence otherwise prohibited.
The Morgan court, then, created a redundant protection for defendants
at a great cost to sexual assault victims based on a flawed interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause.

92. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
93. Id. at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring).
94. 226 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2000).
95. Id. at 736–37.
96. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1) (delineating purposes for which evidence
may be submitted).
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D. The Holding Violates the Alaska Constitution’s Protections for
Victims
Finally, the court’s holding in Morgan violates victims’ rights under
the Alaska Constitution. In Article I, § 24, the Alaska Constitution
provides that crime victims have “the right to be treated with dignity,
respect, and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile
justice process . . . . ”97 A Utah case interpreting a similar provision in
the Utah Constitution explained the purpose of this constitutional right
thusly:
‘Victims who do survive their attack, and are brave enough to
come forward, turn to their government expecting it to . . .
protect the innocent . . . . Without the cooperation of victims
and witnesses in reporting and testifying about crime, it is
impossible in a free society to hold criminals accountable.
When victims come forward to perform this vital service,
however, they find little protection. They discover instead that
they will be treated as appendages of a system appallingly out
of balance. They learn that somewhere along the way the
system has lost track of the simple truth that it is supposed to
be fair and to protect those who obey the law while punishing
those who break it. Somewhere along the way, the system
began to serve lawyers and defendants, treating victims with
institutionalized disinterest.’ . . . Utah law now recognizes that
victims have fared poorly in the criminal justice system and
that they are to be more involved in the process of punishing
the acts of which they became unwilling participants.98
This passage is an example of what truly should be a general
principle, particularly in states like Alaska where protections for victims
are explicit in the constitution—that the rights, interests, and dignity of
crime victims should be balanced against, rather than subordinated to,
those of criminal defendants. Such provisions recognize that
constitutional protections that exist to prevent unjust imprisonment of
innocent defendants should not be extended so far that bona fide crime
victims are unjustly harmed. Ideally, this would require courts to
balance the interests of victims against the interests of defendants when

97. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (1959).
98. State v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56, 60 (Utah 2002) (quoting President’s Task Force
on Victims of Crime, Final Report, iv (1982). See also Paul Cassell, Balancing the
Scales of Justice: The Case for and the Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1994) (quoting President’s Task Force on Victims
of Crime, Final Report, iv (1982)).
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extending the protections of the constitution.
The Morgan court applied no such balancing test and in doing so
undermined the purpose of Alaska’s constitution.99 As the Texas court
explained, evidence of prior false reports—even if it is accurate—has the
potential to be inflammatory and confusing for jurors.100 A single prior
instance where a victim made an allegedly false report, unlike
admissible opinion testimony that a crime victim is a dishonest person,
is minimally probative of the truth or falsity of the charges in a current
case. Thus, the evidence has minimal legitimate value in helping jurors
establish the truth. The evidence has substantial illegitimate value,
however, to a defendant who wishes to prevent a trial by embarrassing
the victim, threatening to call the victim a liar in court, and shifting the
focus of the allegations from the defendant’s recent misconduct to the
victim’s past conduct. Because allowing the admission of prior allegedly
false reports by sexual assault victims provides the defendant only
minimally legitimate benefit at significant risk of unjust harm to a
victim, the court in Morgan created an unconstitutional exception to the
Alaska Rules of Evidence.

V. A PETITION FOR CHANGE
The law must be changed—and quickly. Morgan provides criminal
defendants with a legally indefensible weapon with which to attack
their victims, and does not help courts or juries determine the truth. It
serves no just purpose, and yet has the potential to cause significant
additional harm to a vulnerable group of people.
The following proposed legislation, if adopted, would be ideal
given the concerns outlined in this Article:
The Legislature, having found that the credibility of sexual assault or
sexual abuse victims is not a matter of special relevance in prosecutions
for sexual assault, sexual abuse, attempted sexual assault, or attempted
sexual abuse, hereby passes the following:
(a) In prosecutions for the crimes of sexual assault in any degree,
sexual abuse of a minor in any degree, unlawful exploitation of
a minor, or an attempt to commit any of these crimes, evidence
that the complaining witness has made a prior report of sexual

99. See Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (asserting
the proper burden without mentioning a balancing approach).
100. Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). See Longsway,
supra note 81.
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assault in any degree, sexual abuse of a minor in any degree, or
unlawful exploitation of a minor in any degree may not be
admitted nor may reference be made to it in the presence of the
jury except as provided in this section.
(b) When the defendant seeks to admit the evidence for any
purpose, the defendant shall apply for an order of the court not
later than five days before the trial or at a later time as the court
may, for good cause shown, permit.
(c) After the application is made, the court shall conduct a hearing
in camera to determine the admissibility of the evidence. The
evidence shall only be deemed admissible if the court finds that
evidence offered by the defendant is relevant, that the
probative value of the evidence offered is not outweighed by
the probability that its admission will create undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or unwarranted invasion of the privacy
of the complaining witness, that the evidence otherwise
complies with all laws, regulations, and rules governing the
admission of evidence, and that the defendant has proved by
clear and convincing evidence that:
1) the complaining witness has made a prior report of
sexual assault;
2) the report was false; and
3) the complaining witness knew the report was false.
(d) A prior report of sexual assault in any degree, sexual abuse of a
minor in any degree, unlawful exploitation of a minor in any
degree, or an attempt to commit any of these crimes is “false”
for purposes of this section if the evidence presented to the
court is establishes that the incident reported did not, in fact,
occur. Recantation, delayed report, non-cooperation with law
enforcement, and/or lack of evidence corroborating the
complaining witness’s prior report are not adequate to
establish that a report is false under this section.
(e) Evidence otherwise admissible under this section shall not be
admitted if the prior report was made more than five years
before the date of the present offense.
(f) In this section “complaining witness” means the alleged victim
of the crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to this
section.
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This statutory language, which is based in part on the wording and
procedures of Alaska’s rape shield law,101 should not be necessary. In
the absence of the decision in Morgan the rules of evidence operate to
establish that (1) evidence of a prior false report is not relevant and thus
not admissible unless it is provably false and (2) even if it is held to be
relevant, it is not admissible because it is a specific prior bad act unless
certain conditions provided for in the rules of evidence have been met.
After Morgan, however, the preamble stating the Legislature’s purpose is
necessary to limit the court’s ability to overturn the law on the basis of
the reasoning in that case, and the specific language of the statute is
needed to eliminate the exception and return the credibility of sexual
assault and sexual abuse victims to the realm of the rules of evidence.

VI. CONCLUSION
Sexual assault and sexual abuse victims in Alaska are afforded little
protection from court-sanctioned embarrassment, harassment, or
persecution by their assailants. The law in Morgan perpetuates the
“system appallingly out of balance,” decried in State v. Blake, and shows
that Alaska’s “system has lost track of the simple truth that it is
supposed to be fair and to protect those who obey the law while
punishing those who break it.”102 This wrong can be easily righted,
however, and it is my hope that practitioners, legislators, and judicial
officers will heed the call in this Article and take action to protect the
rights of victims in Alaska.

101. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045.
102. Blake, 63 P.3d at 60.

